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Valorization
The National Valorization Committee describes knowledge valorization
as the “process of creating value from knowledge, by making knowledge
suitable and/or available for social (and/or economic) use and by making
knowledge suitable for translation into competitive products, services, pro-
cesses and new commercial activities”. Based on this definition, in this
chapter, I will explain the knowledge valorization of this dissertation. For
this, I will first outline the general idea of this research. Then, I will elab-
orate how the findings of this thesis have social and economic relevance, in
other words, importance. I will describe which target groups can benefit
from this research. Furthermore, I will explain the activities and prod-
ucts in which this thesis may result. Finally, I will mention the innovative
features and possible implementations of this dissertation.
To begin with, this dissertation considers managerial delegation and re-
muneration systems from a game theoretical perspective. It investigates
how these managerial incentive schemes interact with each other in a two-
firm industry. It studies how profits, production, welfare and international
trade are affected by employing performance evaluation systems for man-
agers. Furthermore, it tries to find the best incentive system for enterprizes
and introduces a new managerial incentive scheme for companies. In ad-
dition to the aforementioned contributions, the research reported in this
dissertation introduces a new solution method to the game theory litera-
ture. By developing and applying this new solution technique, we provide
an easy, elegant, short and intuitive way of examining managerial perfor-
mance evaluations in game theoretical models. In this regard, this disserta-
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tion has two main aspects. First it is applying the game theory principals
and models to economic and business models. Second, it is providing new
solution techniques which will be useful for other researchers in game the-
ory.
When I described the general idea of this dissertation, I already hinted
at its social and economic relevance, in other words the importance of this
research. Now, I will elaborate further on this relevance and importance.
Many companies nowadays delegate certain responsibilities and authority
to their managers. Companies employ managers for either practical, legal
or administrative reasons. However, no matter what the reason is, the good
performance of managers and the success of companies are vital elements
for firms. Therefore, organizations and researchers always ask : How can
we increase the profits of a company? Is there a way to improve the perfor-
mance of managers? How can a company fulfill certain aims (such as high
sales, high market share etc.)? At this point managerial incentives play
a key role. As indicated by Armstrong et al. (2007), managerial bonuses
can be a way of increasing the motivation, commitment and engagement
of employees; moreover, it is a way of realizing certain aims. Besides that,
managerial incentives can provide a way of being a winner, a leader in mar-
ket competition. As an example, take a two-firm industry where one firm is
only owner-led and the other firm employs a manager with a reward system
based on the firm’s sales. Both firms produce homogeneous products and
compete a` la Cournot. Basu (1995) (by using game theoretic tools) proved
that the firm that benefits from the managerial bonuses based on sales
would be the winner in the market. Irwin (1991) demonstrated empirically
that this was the case when the Dutch East India Company beat its British
rival in the pepper trade in the 17th Century. This is a nice example of the
economic validity of a theoretical result. Although the thesis results are
theoretical, they can provide enterprizes with a general view and contin-
gency strategies about several remuneration schemes. In this regard, this
research presents theoretical answers to some possible “what if” scenar-
ios about managerial reward systems. Therefore, companies, consultancy
firms, and governmental institutions can use them to produce strategies
and policies. This thesis also examines social welfare and the effects of
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performance evaluation schemes on international trade. The thesis shows
theoretically that both social welfare and international trade are affected
positively by using managerial reward systems. Empirically, this can be
seen by considering the Netherlands again. Going back to the paper of
Irwin (1991), we observe that one of the reasons which gave an advantage
to the Netherlands in the “Golden Age” was the gains in the international
trade in the 17th Century16. Therefore, this thesis has theoretical findings
which have both social, economic importance and validity.
When I emphasized the social and economic importance of this thesis,
I alluded to the target groups which can benefit from this research by
providing possible reasons. For the sake of completeness, let us mention
some key aspects. Companies, consultancy firms, manufacturers and in-
vestment banks generally remunerate their managers on a reward system.
For instance, as Ritz (2008) notes General Motors, Daimler Chrysler, Ford,
Toyota, Morgan Stanley and Merrill Lynch17 employ managerial bonus sys-
tems for their executive compensation. Therefore, the results reported in
this thesis can be utilized to construct the remuneration strategies. The
outcomes of this thesis are concerned with two-firm industries. Consider-
ing some sectors where there are generally two firms which are dominant
(e.g., Apple versus Microsoft) in the market, the findings of this thesis show
how to develop remuneration strategies for business. Similarly, the findings
which are related to social welfare and international trade can be used to
implement policies by government agencies and research institutions. For
instance, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD), the Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), the National Bureau
of Economic Research (NBER) and the International Labour Organization
(ILO) mostly have empirical studies on employee reward systems. The re-
sults of this dissertation can provide theoretical perspectives on the studies
of those institutions. Aside from these target groups, another target group
is game theorists. As previously explained, in this thesis, a new solution
technique (called “geometric approach”) is proposed to make the equilib-
rium calculations easier, shorter and more intuitive. Departing from this
16See the book of Rietbergen (1998).
17Examples can be found by also considering publicly disclosed proxy statements.
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technical aspect of the thesis, other game theorists could apply the meth-
ods proposed in this research, to other problems18. Also, as a target group,
experimental economists can test our theoretical results. Consequently,
the findings of this dissertation can be interesting to several academic and
non-academic target groups.
Now, I will elaborate on the products, activities which can result from
this research. I do this considering each chapter separately. To begin
with, the findings of Chapter 2 can shape business strategies about profits,
market competition and social welfare when the industry employs relative
profit performance evaluation for the managers. Similarly, the outcomes of
Chapter 3 can be translated into business strategies about profits, market
competition and social welfare when the industry employs market share
performance evaluation for managers. The results of Chapter 4 do not
only shape business and welfare strategies considering all types of manage-
rial remuneration schemes, but also shape technical methods which other
scientists can use. The results of Chapter 5 can be translated into a new
type of managerial incentive and strategies about how to employ this incen-
tive type. Finally, the research of Chapter 6 examines the implications of
managerial remuneration schemes on international trade from a game theo-
retical view. Therefore, the outcomes of Chapter 6 can shape international
trade policies and business strategies.
When it comes to do research, the natural questions would be about its
innovative characteristics: Are the results new? To what extent are the
outcomes of the research original? etc. In general terms, the contributions
of this thesis to the literature are explained in Chapter 1. Each chapter
also includes a detailed discussion about the contributions of each project
per se as well. Departing from these discussions, it can be claimed that
the findings of this research are innovative. To clarify, in Chapter 2, we fill
a gap concerning to a two-firm industry where both firms employ relative
profit performance evaluations for their managers. In the same Chapter,
we find that even a small change in the difference between firms’ marginal
costs for production causes huge differences between the profits. In Chap-
18For example, two-stage perfect and complete information games, or the VFJS strate-
gic delegation game.
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ter 3, we consider a two-firm industry where both firms use market share
performance evaluations for their managers. In the same Chapter, we con-
clude that a certain change in the difference between firms’ marginal costs
causes the efficient firm to capture the Stackelberg Leadership profits in
the market and improvements in Social Welfare. In Chapter 4, we develop
a solution technique which can be applied to analyze strategic delegation
and managerial incentives in a game theoretical view. In the same chap-
ter, we first implemented our new solution method to the problems solved
in the literature. Therefore, we verified our method and checked the lit-
erature results. Then we implemented it to the problems which are not
solved in the literature yet. In Chapter 5, we pioneered a new managerial
incentive type for owners. We studied how our new managerial remuner-
ation scheme interacts with other bonus types. In both Chapter 4 and 5,
we determined which managerial incentive type is optimal for owners. In
Chapter 6, we contributed extensively to the literature by investigating the
impact of managerial incentives systems on international trade, tariffs and
welfare gains from trade. Therefore, this dissertation does not only verify
(or review) existent findings, but also completes the gaps of the literature
especially with respect to the different marginal costs. It proposes a new
managerial incentive type. It also fills the gaps with respect to the relation-
ship between tariffs, welfare and strategic delegation. As a consequence,
this thesis presents many new and innovative findings.
Once I described the possible valorization plans for the results of this
thesis, how to implement and schedule these plans are natural questions.
The answers differ depending on the valorization plan. As it is elaborated
above, one valorization plan is to create strategies and policies for busi-
ness, companies and governments based on the theoretical results of this
thesis. For this, aside from the theoretical approach , verifying (testing)
the possible strategies by empirical analysis could be useful. Companies
publicly disclose the managerial remunerations schemes (with amounts) in
their annual proxy statements. These proxy statements are already avail-
able to everyone via Internet. However, the collection of other types of
data to do empirical analysis could require some cost. Since these proxy
statements and other data about companies are generally published yearly,
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the schedule of the implementation of this type of valorization plan could
take a year. Another valorization plan is to test the theoretical results
by experimental economists. Setting experiments and analysing the data
could take cost and time. The last valorization plan is the implementation
of technical methods (proposed in this thesis) by other game theorists. For
this, there is no specific cost or scheduling involved.
Of course, this dissertation explores managerial remuneration schemes
and their impact on business, market, social welfare and international trade
by using game theory. It would be interesting to see the extensions, appli-
cations and empirical implication of this research.
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